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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
8517

FRANK DAVID CLAUSON,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Frank David Clauson, appellant here, was by jury trial
found guilty of the crime of sodomy ; after psychiatric examination as required by Title 77, Chapter 49, Section 1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, he was sentenced to be incarcerated in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term
of not less than three nor more than twenty years.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's brief states the facts in a light most favorable to appellant; respondent does not adopt the facts as
stated by appellant. Albeit the complaining witness had
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previously been charged with adultery (R. 35) and offered
to submit to intercourse in a proper manner with the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime charged
(R. 35 and 41) the defendant and appellant so conducted
himself as to place the complaining witness in fear for her
very life. He placed a wire around her neck; (R. 16) he
threatened her with a yellow-handled pocket knife, he placed
the point of the blade against her ribs; (R. 18) he cut her
with the knife; (R. 19) he threatened her life with the
knife declaring:
"I can take and use this on you [the knife] and
take you over and get some dry twigs and limbs and
put you on top of them, and put gas on them and
nobody will ever find you.

*

*

*

*

"I have done it before and they have never got
me" (R. 21).
This was the testimony of the complaining witness; the
jury apparently believed sufficient of it to establish the
commission of the crime charged.
The defendant and appellant tells another story (R.
99, 132). He admits being with the complaining witness
on the day of the offense; (R. 103) they drank beer and
wine together and visited \Vith her sister; he accounts for
the time taken on the trip from Park City to Heber as
having been spent sleeping in his car at Keetley; (R. 108)
he had the complaining witness throw the wine bottle out
of the car on the highway after leaving Keetley and on the
way to Heber (R. 110 and 121). [The sheriff found the
bottle at the scene of the crime (R. 88) .] He admitted
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ownership of the knife which had been identified and placed
in evidence (R. 129). The jury may have relied more upon
what the sheriff said on rebuttal (R. 133, 134) than upon
the words of your appellant; appellant had at no time prior
to the trial claimed to be sleeping a way the time during
which the commission of the crime occurred.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE FORMS OF VERDICT FURNISHED BY
THE COURT WERE ADEQUATE AND SUFFICIENT.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC'TIONS.
POINT III
THE COURT· BELOW DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE SHERIFF TO TESTIFY AS TO
A CONVERSATION HAD BETWEEN THE
SHERIFF AND THE DEFENDANT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FORMS OF VERDICT FURNISHED BY
THE COURT WERE ADEQUATE AND SUFFICIENT.
The jury was instructed in part, as follows:
"You are instructed that contained within the
principal crime of Sodomy as charged in the Infor-
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mation in this case, is the lesser crime of attempt to
commit the crime of Sodomy. In this connection
you are instructed that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the principal crime charged in the
Information when he has the present intent to commit such crime, and performs an overt act or overt
acts tending to the commission of the principal
crime as charged in the Information but fails in, or
is prevented from, accomplishing such principal
crime charged in the Information because of being
prevented from full accomplishment of his purpose
to commit such principal crime by resistance on the
part of the one upon who he would commit such an
offense or by the interference of circumstances
which are against the will and purpose of the defendant himself."
"You are instructed that the material allegations of the Information as the same apply to the
lesser offense of an attempt to commit the crime of
Sodomy are as follows:
"1. That on or about the 14th day of September, 1955 the defendant, Frank David Clauson, attempted to insert his penis into the anus or into the
mouth of Mavis North.
"2. That the consummation of such attempt
was prevented by the resistance of the said Mavis
North or by some circumstance outside of the defendant himself.
"3. That such attempt occurred at Wasatch
County, State of Utah.
"You are further instructed that if you find
that the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond
reasonable doubt each and both of the foregoing
material allegations numbered 1 and 2, and should
you further find from the evidence that the material
allegation numbered 3, has been proved by the State
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by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant is guilty of the crime of attempt to commit
Sodomy as charged in the Information and it is your
duty to so find. But if from a full, fair and impartial consideration of all of such evidence you have
a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of such
m·aterial allegations numbered 1 and 2, or should
you further find that the State has failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence allegation numbered 3, then you cannot find the defendant guilty
of the crime of attempt to commit Sodomy as
charged in said Information and it is your duty to
acquit him."
The Court also instructed the jury :
"You are instructed that it is your duty to consider all of the evidence given in this case as the
same applies to the principal crime of Sodomy as
charged in the Information. And if you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty thereof, it is your duty to so find, and to
then disregard the instructions given herewith which
pertain to the included offense of attempt to commit
Sodomy as charged in the said Information. But if
after a full, fair and impartial consideration of all
of such evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime
of Sodomy as charged in the Information, then it is
your duty to determine from the evidence given in
this case, as the same applies to the charge of attempt to commit Sodomy as charged in the Information, whether or not the defendant is guilty of
the lesser offense of attempt to commit Sodomy.
And if from such a consideration of the evidence you
are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of attempt to commit
Sodomy, it is your duty to convict him of such crime.
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But if you then have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime
of attempt to commit Sodomy, then you must acquit
him.
"In other words, it is your duty to first consider all of the evidence given as the same applies to
the principal crime charged, and to consider such
evidence as the same applies to the lesser offense
charged, only if you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the principal crime
charged. If then you are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of one or
the other of such charged offenses, then you must
acquit him."
After which the court furnished the jury the following
forms of verdict :
I

We, the Jury impanelled In the above entitled
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of Sodomy
as charged in the information.
II
We, the Jury impanelled in the above entitled
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of intent
to commit Sodomy charged in the Information.
III
We, the Jury impanelled in the above entitled
cause, find the defendant not guilty.
Appellant was informed against for the crime of sodomy; 76-53-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Assault with
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intent to commit sodomy, 76-7-7, U. C. A. 1953, is, respondent thinks, an included offense. State v. Blythe, 20 Ut.
378, 58 P. 1108; State v. Smith, 90 Ut. 482, 62 P. 2d 1110.
The instructions above set forth clearly informed the jury
of the included offense. Had the jury found from the evidence that the offense was not consummated but that appellant committed an overt act or acts with the intent to
commit the offense a finding of guilty of the lesser included
offense could have been returned.
Appellant contends that intent is an essential element
to the offense of sodomy. This court has held that "no
particular intent is a necessary element of the offense."
State v. Turner, 3 Ut. 2nd, 285 P·. 2d 1045. Based upon the
false premise that intent is. a necessary element to the offense appellant further contends that "* * * the intent to commit sodomy is not a crime under the statute or
at common law;" therefor, says appellant, a form of verdict
should have been furnished the jury upon which the jury
"* * * might have found the defendant guilty of an
attempt to commit sodomy." They deal with niceties and
play with words. The evidence of the state tended to prove
the commission of the completed crime of sodomy as
charged in the information and it was not the duty of the
court to instruct on lessor included offenses whether requested to do so or not. State v. Mitchell, 3 Ut. 2d 70, 278
P. 2 618. Logically, it would follow that where an instruction on an attempt to commit the crime charged was not
requested and not the duty of the court to give, then furnishing the jury with such a verdict form should not be
required. We are familiar with the case of State v. Smith,
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supra, wherein this court makes out a distinction between
attempt to rape and assault with intent to rape and goes
on to say, at page 1117:

"* * * that where the evidence permits, the
trial court should instruct the jury with respect to
offenses included in the charged offense and also
that they may find the defendant guilty of an attempt to commit the offense charged." (Emphasis
added.)
The Idaho Supreme Court in following the holding of
this court in State v. Smith, supra, said:
"It is * * * only where the evidence permits, that the trial court should instruct a jury with
respect to offenses included in the charged offense
and with respect to attempts." State v. Elsen, 187
P. 2d 976, 979. (Emphasis added.)
Be what has been said as it may, the court did in fact
instruct the jury of the attempted offense of assault with
intent to commit sodomy, and did provide the jury with a
form of verdict upon which such a finding might have been
returned. However, from the record itself, it appears more
than clearly reasonable that the jury, having found defendant guilty of the principal offense, did not see fit under
the instructions to give consideration to the included and
lesser charge.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
Appellant's contention is that under the facts and the
testimony the question of whether or not the complaining
"'
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witness was or was not an accomplice was a question of
fact to be submitted to the jury under proper instruction.
Res.pondent thinks appellant misunderstands what constitutes an accomplice. By its accepted terms it can only be
"one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with com.mon
intent with the principal offender unites with him
in the commission of the crime." Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, 12th Ed. p. 229.
Such was not your appellant's defense to the charge in the
court below; appellant's defense was a complete denial of
the commission of the offense. The case for the prosecution was inconsistent with any theory of law involving an
accomplice. In fact, there was no such issue raised on either
side and corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony was
not required. The rule enunciated in State v. Smith, 27 4 P.
2 246, 2 U t. 2, 358, requiring corroboration under 77-31-18,
U. C. A. 1953, is not here applicable.
In this state there is no statutory definition of an accomplice. State v. Caroles, 74 Ut. 94, 277 P. 203; State v.
Cragun, 85 Ut. 149, 38 P. 2 1071; State v. Bowman, 92 Ut.
540, 70 P. 2 458, 461, 111 A. L. R. 1493; State v. Fertig,
Ut.
233 P. 2 347. The rule is in this state, however,
that:
"An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the
defendant on trial." State v. Fertig, supra.
•

0

0

0

0

0,

The evidence for appellant in the case at bar goes to a denial
of the offense charged; the evidence of the prosecution supports the commission of the crime upon the victim by force

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
and through fear. It is true that in many sex crimes such
as adultery, fornication, incest or sodomy, one who participates in the crime is an accomplice in the prosecution of
the other involved. But the general rule has well recognized
exceptions, such as where the crime is committed through
force, threats, duress, fraud or undue influence. The reason
for this is obvious-the intent necessary to constitute one
an accomplice cannot exist with the overcoming of the will
which is an essential ingredient of the commission of an
offense by threat and force. See Hutson v. U. S., U. S. C.
A. 9th Cir., Oct. 1956, 238 F. 2 167. One who consents to
perpetration of sodomy or fellatio on herself solely because
of physical violence or threats of great bodily harm is not
an "accomplice" whose testimony to such offenses must
be corroborated. People v. Bathilana, 126 P. 2 923, 52
Cal. App. 2 685. There are a host of such cases digested,
see American Digest System, Criminal Law 507 (7) ; 77-3114 U. C. A. 1953 is not for application here and the legislature has not as yet seen fit to require corrobor~tion of
the prosecutrix's testimony in all sex offenses in the absence
of the involvement of an accomplice. As a matter of law
the victim was not an accomplice.

POINT III
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE SHERIFF TO TESTIFY AS TO
A CONVE·RSATION HAD BETWEEN THE
SIIERIFF AND THE DEFENDANT.
The sole objection made to the complained of testimony
of the sheriff was that the conversation constituted hearsay.
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Over such objection the sheriff was permitted to testify as
to what he, the sheriff, told the defendant what the complaining witness had said. The sheriff had asked the defendant if he had driven the complaining witness directly
to Heber and the defendant had: replied that he had, and
that he did not stop with the complaining witness anywhere
between Park City and Heber. Thereafter, the sheriff testified that he said to the defendant "I believe I better tell
you what she said". He said "What did she say?" I said
"She claims on the way over to Heber that you drove on
the Kamas road and took her up some place where you
had illicit sexual relations." He said "That is not true, I
drove her straight to Heber". I said "She makes it even
worse than that, she said that you used a wire around her
throat and also that you stuck her with a knife in an attempt to make her give in to you." He said "That is not
the truth," that he did not take her off the road against
her will at any time. While defendant did deny his guilt,
it is entirely clear that the conversation embraced an admission of the defendant that he had been in the company
of the complaining witness on the date of the offense
charged at or near the scene of the crime. Such evidence is
admissible. Douglas .v. State, Cal., 120 P. 2d 921, 926, State
v. Irwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 P. 2d 285.
We recognize the rule that courts will not receive the
testimony of a witness as to what some other person told
him, as evidence of the existence of the fact asserted. State
Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Ut. 416, 25 P.
2d 612. The reason for this rule is that the unsworn statement of a person not called as a witness or subjected to the
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test of cross-examination is not recognized as having sufficient probative effect to raise an inference that the fact is
as stated. Steel v. Jensen, Wash. 115 P. 2d 145. However,
the objection that evidence is Hearsay is frequently raised
under circumstances not calling for an application of the
Hearsay rule, and the reports are full of cases in which
the courts have refused to sustain such an objection. Golden
v. Keene Cement and Plastic Company, 98 Ut. 23, 95 P. 2d
755. \Ve think that the complete answer upon which the
rule of the court admitting the testimony of the sheriff
should be sustained is to be found in a statement from Corn.monwealth v. Godfrey (Pa.), Vol. I, Section 441, pages
434-435:
"The hearsay rule has no application where the
question is whether certain things were said or
written by a third person, and not whether they are
true."
Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed. Section 1361, says this:
"The theory of the Hearsay rule is that, when
a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth
of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore
the assertion can be received only when made upon
the stand subject to the test of cross-examination.
If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance is offered,
not as an assertion to evidence in the matter asserted, but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply.
The utterance is then merely not obnoxious to that
rule. It may or may not be received, according as it
has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not received, this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule.

*

*

*

*
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"The prohibition of the Hear say rule, then, does
not apply to all words or utterances merely as such.
If this fundamental principal is clearly realized its
application is a comparatively simple matter. The
Hear say rule excludes extra judicial utterances only
when offered for a special purpose, namely as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted.
Mr. Justice Wade, in a concurring opinion, John C. Cutler
Association v. De Jay Stohrs, 3 Ut. 2 107, 279 P. 2d 700,
discusses the above rule as treated by the work of Wigmore.
In the case at bar, the statement by the sheriff was in no
wise an assertion of the truth of the fact, but was merely
in response to a question as to what was said during a
conversation between the defendant and himself; further,
the testimony was in no wise prejudicial since the commission of the offense was clearly and conclusively established
by evidence independent of the testimony of the sheriff.

CONCLUSION
The verdict and sentence should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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